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Abstract—High false alarm rate and low detection rate are
the major sticking points for unknown threat perception. To
address the problems, in the paper, we present a densely con-
nected residual network (Densely-ResNet) for attack recognition.
Densely-ResNet is built with several basic residual units, where
each of them consists of a series of Conv-GRU subnets by
wide connections. Our evaluation shows that Densely-ResNet can
accurately discover various unknown threats that appear in edge,
fog and cloud layers and simultaneously maintain a much lower
false alarm rate than existing algorithms.
Index Terms—attack recognition, cloud computing, deep learn-
ing, neural network, intrusion detection
I. INTRODUCTION
It is well-known that machine learning (ML) has prompted
the development of information technology in many aspects,
such as face recognition and machine translation. It is no
exception that ML can also be used for attack recognition
to improve the trustworthiness and dependability of computer
systems. However, attack recognition is known as a task of
“finding very damaging needles in very large haystacks”
[1], which exhibits disparate difficulties and presents great
challenges in contrast to other classification tasks when using
machine learning.
We claim that using ML for attack recognition should
be careful, which must be accompanied with an elaborately
defined threat model for the sake of minimizing the scale of
detection surface. Nevertheless, due to the monotonous attack
spread-ability, traditional detection surface [2] that is defined
based on abnormal patterns of system usage cannot be fully
adapted and representative for the status in quo of security
requirement. Based on the principle of “defense in depth”
[3], we propose an alternative detection surface, which is
dependent on data fusion from edge layers to cloud layers
as shown in Fig 1. The new detection surface connects three
virtual layers (edge, fog and cloud layers) as a whole in order
that a defense system can be more comprehensively to discover
external attacks that attempt to invade an operating system but
from different dimensions.
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In this paper, a densely connected residual network
(Densely-ResNet) is deployed on the detection surface, which
is constructed with several basic residual units, where each of
them contains two Conv-GRU subnets by wide connections.
Densely-ResNet has several compelling advantages: it allevi-
ates the vanishing-gradient problem, strengthens the learning
stability, reduces the feature loss, encourages the feature reuse
and extends the depth and width of neural network in a feed-
forward fashion. The evaluation result shows that Densely-
ResNet tends to increase the complexity of computation but
demonstrates a much better accuracy and lower false-positive
rate than existing algorithms for attack recognition and signif-
icantly outperforms the current state-of-the-art results on the
benchmark attack dataset. Our contributions are summarized
as follow:
• We construct a new cybers threat assessment testbed
called Ton IoT that involves Edge (IoT devices), Fog
(endpoints) and Cloud (network services) layers as a
syncretic detection surface, which can be used to monitor
and collect multi-sourced system records from various
attack scenarios.
• We propose a novel densely connected residual network
(Densely-ResNet) for attack recognition and unknown
threat perception. Densely-ResNet can achieve state-of-
the-art detection accuracy and lowest false alarm rate
on UNSW-NB15 benchmark, which significantly outper-
forms existing algorithms.
• We develop a correlation analysis module to post-analyze
the prediction result of Densely-ResNet, which can re-
move the redundant alarms that are not false positives
but unsuccessful attack attempts to mitigate the problem
of alarm fatigue.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Attack Classification
1) Reconnaissance: Before beginning to breach a victim
machine, hackers commonly utilize tools such as Nessus
[4] and Nmap [5] to scan and sniffer the local network
configurations of the targeted system, which aims to discover
some available ports that are opened and can be potentially
exploited. Besides, after the stage of privilege escalation,
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hackers may sign into the victim machine and then execute
a series of commands to run an internal reconnaissance,
such as DNS Reconnaissance (cmd → nslookup), Directory
Service Reconnaissance (cmd → net user/domain) and
User and IP Address Reconnaissance (cmd → NetSess.exe
ContosoDC), which purposes to discover computers of in-
terest, enumerate users and groups, collect important IP ad-
dresses, and evaluate the organization’s assets and weaknesses.
2) SQL Injection (SQLI) Attack: SQLI allows malicious
users to execute illegal SQL quires that are embedded with
URL parameters to modify the database for extracting valu-
able and sensitive information. Complex variations of SQL
injection attack, such as ‘Out-of-Band SQLI’, can also be
launched by phishing emails that consist of the query results
with injected SQL codes, which can result in data theft, data
loss and even full system compromise.
3) Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Attack: XSS can inject ar-
bitrary JavaScript into a legitimate website or web applica-
tion which is then executed inside a victims browser. The
JavaScript contains malicious codes, such as webshell or
‘one word Trojan’, once being executed, it will build a
network socket to communicate with the offensive server.
White/Black list strategy is a common defense skill to prevent
the JavaScript injection; however, because of the misused and
insecure JavaScript programming, XSS attacks are still active
in common attack categories and existing many skills to bypass
the white/black list detection mechanism.
4) Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS): DDoS attack
requires to remotely control a number of infected computers
(Botnets) then command them to send a massive volume of
legitimated requests through a variety of protocols, such as
HTTP flood, SYN flood and DNS amplification, to overflow
the capacity of a targeted system. The goal of DDoS attack is
attempting to congest the traffic result in service disable.
5) Ransomware and Worm: Ransomware attack is a form
of malware that can encrypt victim’s files and then demand
a ransom from the victim to restore access to the data upon
payment. Ransomware are typically carried out using a Trojan
that is disguised as a legitimate file that the user is tricked
into downloading or opening when it arrives as an email
attachment.
6) Advanced Persistent Threat (APT): APT is a combina-
tion of several elaborately designed cyber attacks, which use
different tactic techniques launched by well-trained hackers
who aim to steal sensitive and valuable information from
enterprises and governments out of different profitable pur-
poses. APTs can utilize a combination of vulnerabilities to
exploit the target systems for building the Command & Control
(C&C) communications between several victim machines and
offensive systems [6].
Due to the high degree of their sophistication and conceal-
ing, APTs are hard to be discovered by traditional intrusion
detection systems, of which detection engines are based on
association rules and abnormal patterns. Besides, a lack of
relatively real and sophisticated threat assessment environment
is also one of the serious problems for the experimental
evaluation of APT perception.
Furthermore, an APT may also take advantages of a variety
of break-in methods, such as driven-by-download or a spear-
phishing attack, which will invoke a series of processes
and I/O operations each time that demonstrates a significant
diversification against the assumption that we naively proposed
for the trace detection - “an APT may follow an unique file
path differed from normal behaviour in a provenance graph”
[7]. It can be argued that a hacker may have various approaches
to break in a system, but whom may only have a few ways to
clean up the attack remnants and the consequences of intrusion
behaviour are irreversible.
Thus, we suggest that, except the analysis of file paths based
on their corresponding provenance graphs, the result-oriented
detection is also essential for APT detection, which should be
included within the kernel-level audit data, such as the occur-
rences of I/O operation (read/write file), the changes of virtual
memory allocation in bytes (execute malicious bash script),
the incremental sizes of outbound network packet (build C&C
communication) and the performance consumption of CPU
processor (trace elimination / side channel attack). It can be
assumed that, when an APT is active in a victim system, it
may present kernel-level characteristic differences compared
to the normal usage of system activities.
B. Defense Mechanism
1) Signature-Based Pattern Matching Defense System:
The most common-used intrusion detection system (IDS) in
commercial environments is signature-based or rule-based.
Blue team can simulate attacks in a controlled test environment
and then extract the most representative features as attack
signatures through an in-depth runtime analysis. IDS can
make relevant association rules in line with well-defined attack
signatures to construct a black list to prevent both internal and
external intrusions. It has been proved that the signature-based
or rule-based IDS can achieve a low false alarm rate (FAR)
in practice; however, the weakness is that the hand-designed
attack signatures contains excessively detailed descriptions of
some specific attacks, which make IDS incapacitate to discover
novel attacks [8].
2) Data-Centric-Based Artificial Intelligence Defense Sys-
tem: The weakness of signature-based IDS has become partic-
ularly apparent since the increasing complexity and number of
unknown cyber attacks in recent years. It is suggested that tra-
ditional rule-based detection engines should be replaced with
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Fig. 2. Ton IoT Cyber Threat Assessment Testbed
artificial intelligence based engines to enhance the capability
of IDS on discovering unknown attacks.
Unsupervised learning [9] and statistical learning, such as
K-means [10] and Local Outlier Factor (LOF) [11], are used
for an initial attempt of developing AI for intrusion detection.
These approaches can construct a profile for prediction that is
only based on normal activities but without requiring any pre-
vious knowledge of attack. The advantage of such approaches
is able to significantly reduce the cost of data collection and
data labelling; also, it can theoretically improve the possibility
of discovering unknown attacks. However, the argument is that
unsupervised learning for intrusion detection may achieve an
impressive performance in a controlled laboratory environment
but it may demonstrate a significantly performance degradation
in practice [12].
Supervised learning is another AI approach used for intru-
sion detection, which has shown a great potential on practical
implementations [13]. In contrast to unsupervised learning,
supervised learning requires to learn a labelled dataset, which
consists of both knowledge of normal and malicious activities.
The advantage of using labelled dataset is able to significantly
narrow the scale of detection surface to avoid the ‘Needles
in Haystacks’ problem [1] that we have mentioned in Sec-
tion I. Main stream supervised learning algorithms can be
classified into classical machine learning (ML) approaches,
such as Support Vector Machine (SVM), Random Forest (RF)
and Adaptive Boosting (AdaBoost), and deep learning (DL)
approaches, such as Convolution Neural Network (CNN),
Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) and Graph Neural Network
(GNN).
From the algorithmic perspective, both classical and deep
learning approaches have advantages and drawbacks. Classical
ML requires a series of well-defined features that are manually
designed by human experts as inputs for training to achieve
its effectiveness. The advantage of classical ML is that hand-
designed features can improve the interpretability of ML for
intrusion detection so that can further eliminate the semantic
gap between AI detectors with security analysts. However, it
is similar to the weakness of signature-based approach; these
features are defined excessively specific, which may lead to
a drop of generalization performance once the targeted attack
category beginning to variate.
DL approaches have partially addressed the problem of
feature dependency [14] that confused the ML community in
a decade. DL utilizes neural networks to construct a stack of
learning layers as fixed feature extractors, which allows new
representations can be self-learnt from its old representations.
It has been proven that learnt features are better than hand-
designed features for the task of generalized learning [15].
However, the drawback of DL approach is relatively contra-
dictory to its advantage, because the features learnt by a neural
network contain a certain degree of abstracted implications,
which are hard to be understood, explained and analyzed by
security analysts. The problem makes AI experts have to select
more explicable security dataset for learning and attempt to
map the low-level meanings of abstracted representation to
their corresponding high-level attack stages, such as which
part in the feature map is on behalf of initial compromise,
latency movement or exfiltration, which significantly limits
the effectiveness and practical applicability on applying DL
for intrusion detection.
III. TON IOT CYBER THREAT ASSESSMENT TESTBED
Ton IoT cyber threat assessment testbed is built at the
Cyber Range and IoT Lab, School of Engineering and In-
formation technology (SEIT), UNSW Canberra located with
the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA). The testbed
can simulate several cyber-attack events by using different
hacking techniques to against web applications, IoT gateways
and computer systems across the edge layer, fog layer and
cloud layer as shown in Fig 2.
Edge layer involves the physical devices and their operating
systems utilized as the infrastructure of configuring the virtu-
alization technology and cloud services at the layers of fog and
cloud, respectively. It includes multiple IoT devices, such as
Modbus and light bulb sensors, smartphones and smart TVs,
as well as host systems, such as workstations and servers, used
to connect IoT devices, hypervisors and physical gateways
(i.e. routers and switches) to the internet. The hypervisor
technology of NSX-VMware [16] was installed on a host
server at the edge layer to manage the Virtual Machines (VMs)
created at the fog layer.
Fog layer includes the virtualization technology that con-
trols the VMs and their services using the NSX-VMware and
vCloud platform [17] to offers the framework of executing
SDN and NFV in the proposed testbed. The NSX vCloud NFV
platform enables the design of a dynamic testbed IoT network
of the Ton IoT with creating and controlling several VMs for
hacking and normal operations, allowing the communications
between the edge, fog and cloud layers via vSwitches and
gateways. This layer includes the nodes of virtual machines
configured to generate the datasets, as explained below:
• Orchestrated Server - is one of the main virtualized
servers configured in the testbed using the Ubuntu14.04
LTS with the IP address 192.168.1.190. This server of-
fered many orchestrated services, such as FTP, Kerberos,
HTTPs, and DNS to simulate real production networks
and generate more simulated network traffic using the
Ostinato Traffic Generator [18] that transmits traffic to
other VMs in the testbed.
• Middleware Server - is the IoT virtualized server de-
ployed in the testbed using the Ubuntu 18.04 with the IP
address 192.168.1.152. This server included the scripts
that run IoT services through public and local MQTT
gateways utilized in the testbed and linked with the cloud
layer to subscribe and publish the telemetry data of IoT
sensors.
• Client Systems - include a Windows 7 VM (IP
address:192.168.1.193), Windows 10 VM (IP ad-
dress:192.168.1.195), DVWA web service (IP ad-
dress:192.168.1.192), OWASP security Sphered VM
(IP address:192.168.1.184), Metaspoitable3 (IP ad-
dress:192.168.194). The two windows were used as
the remote web interface of the node-red (IP ad-
dress:192.168.1.152) and their network traffic and audit
traces were logged. The DVWA (Damn Vulnerable Web
App) [19] was utilized to make security vulnerabilities
through web applications hacked using the virtualized
offensive systems. The OWASP security Sphered VM
[20] is an open-source platform that has many secu-
rity vulnerabilities against mobile and web applications
exploited using the offensive systems. In addition, the
Metasploitable3 VM [21] was deployed in the testbed
to increase vulnerable fog nodes and hack them using
various attacking techniques by the offensive systems.
• Offensive Systems - include the Kali Linux VMs and
scripts of hacking scenarios that exploit vulnerable sys-
tems in the testbed network. Ten static IP addresses (i.e.
192.168.1.30-39) were employed in the testbed to launch
attacking scenarios and breach vulnerable systems either
IoT services (client and public MQTT brokers and node-
red IP), operating systems (i.e. Windows 7 and 10, and
Ubuntu 14.04 LTS and 18.04 LTS), and network systems
(i.e. IP addresses and open protocols of the VMs).
• Data Logger System - is to log network traffic of
the ToN IoT datasets, the Security Onion VM [22] (IP
address:192.168.1.180) was used to log network data
from all the active systems in the testbed using a virtual
mirror switch that forwards the entire network traffic
to this VM without dropping any traffic. As shown in
Figure 1, the netsniff-ng tool [23] was used to capture
the entire network packets from the entire systems in
pcap formats without packet drops. The Zeek Network
Security Monitor tool (previously named Bro) [24] was
used to generate data features from the pcap files.
Cloud layer contains the cloud services configured online
in the testbed. The fog and edge services connected with the
public HIVE MQTT dashboard [25], public PHP vulnerable
website [26], cloud virtualization, and cloud data analytics
services (e.g., Microsoft Azure or AWS). The public HIVE
MQTT dashboard enabled us to publish and subscribe to the
telemetry data of IoT services via the configuration of the
node-red tool. The public PHP vulnerable website used to
launch injection hacking events against websites. The other
cloud services were configured either in Microsoft Azure or
AWS to transmit sensory data to the cloud and visualize their
patterns.
IV. DESCRIPTION OF THREAT MODEL
A. Attack Scenarios on Ton IoT Testbed
Ton IoT testbed contains several attack scenarios against
vulnerable elements of IoT applications, operating systems,
network systems, which are used to evaluate the proposed
Densely-ResNet. The scripts and some links of the attacking
categories are published in [27]. The attack families utilized
in the Ton IoT dataset are explained as follows:
• Scanning attack - we used the Nessus and Nmap
tools from the offensive systems with IP addresses
192.168.1.20-38 against the target subnet 192.168.1.0/24
and all other public vulnerable systems such as the Public
MQTT broker and vulnerable PHP website. For example,
nmap 192.168.1.40-254, and the scans of the Nessus tool
for the same range of IP addresses.
• Denial of Service (DoS) attack - we utilized DoS attack
scenarios on the offensive systems with IP addresses
192.168.1.{30,31,39} to hack vulnerable elements in the
IoT testbed network. We created Python scripts using the
Scapy package to launch the DoS attacks [28].
• Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack - we
used DDoS attacks in the offensive systems wit IP ad-
dresses 192.168.1.{30,31,34,35,36,37,38} to breach sev-
eral weaknesses in the IoT testbed network. We developed
Python scripts using the Scapy package to launch the DoS
attacks. Further, automated bash scripts were developed
to launch DDoS against vulnerable nodes of the testbed
using the ufonet toolkit [29].
• Ransomware attack - we utilized the Kali Linux with
IP addresses 192.168.1.{33,37} to execute this malware
against windows operating systems and their webpages of
monitoring IoT services included in the testbed network.
TABLE I
GROUND TRUTH OF UNSW-NB15
Attack Category Attack Reference Attack Description
Reconnaissance
CVE 2002-0563 Oracle 9iAS Dynamic Monitoring Services Anonymous Access Variant 2
CVE 2002-0563 Oracle 9iAS Dynamic Monitoring Services Anonymous Access Variant 8
Exploits
CVE 2009-0227 Microsoft Office PowerPoint Legacy File Format Stack Overflow (POP3 Base64)
CVE 2008-4261 Internet Explorer - HTML Rendering Buffer Overflow
CVE 2006-4076 BerliOS Docpile:we access.inc.php INIT PATH Parameter PHP File Include
Fuzzers
NULL Fuzzer: OSPF Database Description Packet: Basic
NULL Fuzzer: HTTP GET Request Invalid URI
Generic
CVE 2011-2748 McAfee SiteManager ActiveX Control ExportSiteList Buffer Overflow
CVE 2006-2934 Linux Kernel SMB Filesystem receive Transaction2 vulnerability
DoS
CVE 2013-6449 OpenSSL ssl get algorithm2 TLS Denial of Service
CVE 2011-0475 Google Chrome PDF Viewer Use-After-Free (HTTP)
CVE 2007-1030 DNS Label Compression Recursion (zlip-1/UDP)
Analysis NULL Analysis: IP Protocol Scan
Backdoor
CVE 2014-2269 Vtiger CRM Unauthenticated Password Reset
CVE 2012-5159 phpmyadmin 3.5.2.2 Backdoor Access and Code Execution
CVE 2013-3585 Samsung DVR Authentication Bypass
Shellcode
milw0rm-1308 Linux PPC Read Execute - core (UDP)
NULL Mac OS X PPC Bind Shell - metasploit (UDP)
NULL Windows x86 Execute Command - metasploit (UDP) Variant 2
Worms
MSB MS02-039 Microsoft SQL Server Slammer/Saphire Worm
CVE 2006-2492 Trojan.MDropper Word Document (http) Variant 2
CVE 2005-1921 Lupper.A XML-RPC Propogation Request Variant 13
This attack executed using the Metasploit framework
that hacks the SMB vulnerability of the systems, named
eternalblue [30].
• Backdoor attack - we used the offensive systems with
IP addresses 192.168.1.{33,37} to keep the hacking per-
sistence using the Metasploit framework by executing a
bash script of the command ‘run persistence -h’ [31].
• Injection attack - we used various injection sce-
narios from the offensive systems with IP addresses
192.168.1.{30,31,33,35} to inject data inputs against web
applications of DVWA and Security Shepherd VMs and
webpages of IoT services through other VMs, including
SQL injection, client-side injection,broken authentication
and data management, and unintended data leakage.
• XSS attack - we employed the offensive systems with IP
addresses 192.168.1.{32,35,36,39} to illegally inject web
applications of DVWA and Security Shepherd VMs and
webpages of IoT services through other VMs. In these
systems, we created malicious bash scripts of python
codes to hack the web applications of the testbed network
using the Cross-Site Scripter toolkit (named XSSer) [32].
• Password attack - we used the offensive systems with IP
addresses 192.168.1.{30,31,32,35,38}. In these systems,
the hydra [33] and cewl [34] toolkits were configured
using automated bash scripts to concurrently launch pass-
word hacking scenarios against vulnerable nodes in the
testbed.
• Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attack - we utilized the
offensive systems with IP addresses 192.168.1.{31,34} to
launch various MITM scenarios in the testbed network.
In the systems, we employed the Ettercap tool [35] to
execute ARP spoofing, ICMP redirection, port stealing
and DHCP spoofing.
B. Attack Scenarios on UNSW-NB15 Benchmark
In addition to the Ton IoT testbed, we also evaluate the
performance of Densely-ResNet on UNSW-NB15 benchmark
dataset [36], [37]. The UNSW-NB15 dataset contains several
attack categories: DoS, Exploits, Generic, Shellcode, Recon-
naissance, Backdoor, Worms, Analysis and Fuzzers, which
are collected from Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures1,
1CVE: https://cve.mitre.org/
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Symantec2, Microsoft Security Bulletin3.
The raw network packets of the UNSW-NB15 dataset is
created by the IXIA PerfectStorm tool in the Cyber Range
Lab of the Australian Centre for Cyber for generating a hybrid
of real modern normal activities and synthetic contemporary
attack behaviours. It is worth noting that each attack event of
UNSW-NB15 is simulated from a real-world attack scenario
with a specific attack reference, which has been listed and
described in Table 1.
Moreover, in our evaluation, we conduct the experiment
with a plenty of real-world attack scenarios, which are in-
cluded but are not only limited to those shown in Table 1.
The actual attack reference used for our evaluation is in the
range from CVE-1999-XXXX to CVE-2015-XXXX.
V. DENSELY RESIDUAL NETWORK (DENSELY-RESNET)
Traditional ML suffers three main challenges for network
intrusion detection:
1) Over-reliance on well-defined features: Traditional
ML requires specific and elaborate representations,
which are usually designed by our security experts.
However, hand-designed features include excessively
detailed descriptions that commonly result in a poor
generalization performance on discovering novel attacks.
2) Performance bottleneck: Traditional ML, particularly
kernel machine, suffers a problem called ‘the curse of
dimensionality’ [14], which significantly limits the effec-
tiveness of ML on learning big data with continuously
increasing scale and complexity.
3) Unexplained result: ML can contribute impressive re-
sult when training or testing data are under a well-
curved distribution, such as a Gaussian Distribution. To
achieve this, it is imperative to encode raw data to their
statistical representations, which can be further used for
a learning task. However, these statistical features are
eventually inappropriate to be used for attack proof and
identification for threat elimination.
To address the above problems, we propose a densely
connected residual network (Densely-ResNet) to reduce the
2BID: https://www.securityfocus.com
3MSD: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/securitybulletins
cost of feature engineering, improve the generalization perfor-
mance on discovering novel attacks and further enhance the
result interpretability for attack proof and threat elimination.
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A. System Overview
Detection system consists of three modules: Data Interface
and Pipeline, Detection Engine and Correlation Analysis; an
overview of the whole detection system is shown in Fig 3.
Data Interface and Pipeline is an entrance for multi-
sourced data created through Edge, Fog and Cloud layers.
Since the multi-sourced data commonly have various formats,
which cannot be directly processed by our detection engine,
the module incorporates several data preprocessing functions
to clean and normalize the multi-sourced data into a standard,
readable and callable format.
Detection Engine is the core of the detection system that is
completely operated by Densely-ResNet. Densely-ResNet is a
customized deep neural network that consists of a series of
ResNets, which are initially concatenated in a wide-channel
direction and then eventually densely-connected from each
anterior output to the rest of posterior outputs. Densely-ResNet
overcomes several weaknesses of traditional neural networks
and classical ML, such as gradient vanishing and dimension
explosion. Densely-ResNet is one of the most complex and
effective known AI detectors for the task of network intrusion
detection, which can achieve the state-of-the-art result on
UNSW-NB15 benchmark in the evaluation.
Correlation Analysis is a post-analysis module for attack
proof and identification. One problem is that events detected
by our detection engine include a number of statistical con-
tents, which are not explainable for an in-depth causality
analysis. Furthermore, another problem is that events alerted
from a single layer or a single data source are not completely
accurate. The inaccurate alerts, however, are not always false
positives, but should be considered as another situation, which
is ‘attack is happening but may not get success, in other
words, the victim machine has not been compromised yet.’
The correlation analysis module is aimed to solve the above
problems by integrating and analyzing alerts from Edge, Fog
and Cloud layers in order to contribute more authentic and
reliable detection results.
B. Data Interface and Pipeline
Data Interface and Pipeline is a socket that can convert and
encode multi-sourced data to an unified format for the use of
neural networks and other ML algorithms. The socket includes
three functions as listed below:
• Content Normalization: The function can convert multi-
sourced data that have various types, such as xml, pcap
and json, to an unified dataframe, which can be directely
used for ML. Furthermore, the function can also discard
some unexpected values, such as null values and dupli-
cated records, which are harmful to the evaluation.
• Feature Vectorization: Multi-sourced data consist of
many categorical features, such as ip address and pro-
tocol, which cannot be recognized by ML. The function
uses a label-to-index strategy to encode these categorical
features to vectors.
• Standardization: Data may have various distributions
with different means and standard deviations, which
significantly reduce the effectiveness and efficiency of
ML. Hence, we use a standardization function to scale
the data with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.
C. Detection Engine (Densely-ResNet)
Detection Engine uses a novel neural network architecture
(Densely-ResNet) that we proposed in the paper. Densely-
ResNet is constructed by ten ResNets, where a pair of them is
concatenated in a wide-channel direction as shown in Fig 3.
Each ResNet consists of a series of parameter layers as
shown in Fig 4, where BN is Batch Normalization, CNN
is Convolution Neural Network, GRU is Gated Recurrent
Unit and RD is Reshape Dimensionality. Densely-ResNet
has several remarkable advantages that enable to improve its
generalization performance on discovering novel attacks.
1) Spatial-temporal Learning: It is a truth that CNN is
effective to learn a grid of values, such as pixels in images, of
which features are spatial-oriented; and GRU usually performs
well on learning a series of sequence data, such as words and
sentences, of which features are temporal-oriented. However,
for the multi-sourced security data, it is unclear to choose
either CNN or GRU that can achieve better results. Based on
part of our experience and some prior work on network traffic
analysis, we claim that, for most of one-dimension security
data, it can be reasonably assumed that the data may have
both spatial and temporal correlations.
2) Feature Reuse: Traditional neural network encounters
a performance degradation problem when one would naively
stack more layers onto the neural network for improving its
learning capability. The reason is that, when going deeper
with neural network, learned features will gradually tend to
be more specific, but far away from their original meanings,
which eventually results in a problem of gradient vanishing.
To address the problem, Densely-ResNet adopts a strategy
of feature reuse, which can mitigate the gradient loss both
locally and globally. To maximize the capability of feature
reuse, as shown in Fig 4, we uses a shortcut connection
to add the output from one previous parameter layer to its
subsequent parameter layer for keeping the local originality
during the whole learning phase. Moreover, as shown in
Fig 3, each pair of the widely-connected ResNets will then
be concatenated into all subsequent pairs of ResNets to keep
the global originality during the whole learning phase.
3) Linear Bridging: Another problem of deep neural net-
work is that, because of its non-linearity, the deep neural
network will produce a slightly different validation result
each time, which requires to be continuously optimized by
retraining the network for obtaining the best result. To reduce
the cost of retraining a neural network, in Densely-ResNet, we
use a Linear Bridging strategy that can transform a series of
nonlinearized parameter layers into a linear space to improve
the learning stability. As a result, the final validation result will
produce a extremely slighted fluctuation, which is not required
to be retrained.
Densely-ResNet uses the global average pooling to finalise
the whole learning phase and then amplifying the distinctions
from selected active neurons. In the end, Densely-ResNet uses
a loss function of categorical cross-entropy to minimize the
error rate for the task of multi-class classification.
D. Correlation Analysis
The correlation analysis module aims to make a causality
analysis based on the provenance of attacks to identify those
truly and successfully happened attack events from a large
number of false positives and failed attempts. To achieve this,
the module will search for and take into considerations of
the prediction results from our detection engine that happened
concurrently in Edge, Fog and Cloud layers within a defined
time threshold to address the problem of ‘attacker knocked
the door but was not there.’ We claim that a true intrusion
event should be able to complete its attack actions in a short
period and can be captured through correlating the detection
results from user, host and network behaviour. Furthermore,
the accuracy of the correlation analysis module should not be
sensitive to the different selections of defined time thresholds,
which will be discussed in our evaluation.
VI. EVALUATION
Our evaluation is based on a cloud AI platform configured
with a Tesla K80 GPU and a total of 12 GB of RAM. The
detection system is completely written in Python; and the
detection engine is built upon tensorflow backend with the
APIs of keras and scikit-learn packages.
A. Feature Selection and Preprocessing
There are 1,359,589 data records from Ton IoT testbed and
257,673 data records from UNSW-NB15 benchmark used for
the evaluation. To ensure the effectiveness of the evaluation,
TABLE II
TESTING PERFORMANCE ON TON IOT TESTBED
Layer Type ACC% TP TN FP FN DR% FAR% Precision% Recall% F1 Score
Edge IoT 98.27 15,611 24,500 0 0 100.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Fog
Windows 99.92 1,707 1,999 1 1 99.94 0.05 99.94 99.94 99.94
Linux 95.51 15,870 29,940 60 163 98.98 0.20 99.62 98.98 99.30
Cloud Network 99.93 16,102 29,971 29 2 99.99 0.10 99.82 99.99 99.90
we select 10% data records from the Ton IoT as a testing
set, where the testing samples are never used for training. For
the UNSW-NB15 benchmark, we use the default training and
testing sets for the evaluation, where the testing set is also
totally unseen in the training set.
Selected features for Ton IoT are sensors activities from
the Edge layer, CPU, memory, disk and process activities
from the Fog layer, and network activities from the Cloud
layer, whereas for UNSW-NB15 benchmark, there are only
network activities available for use. A detailed description of
feature selection for the two datasets can be found in the
referred articles [27], [36]. Finally, all data records used for
both training and testing are uniformly processed by the Data
Interface and Pipeline module.
B. Hyper-parameter Setting for Densely-ResNet
Densely-ResNet requires to configure a series of hyper-
parameters to initialize the deep neural network. Filter size
of convolution and number of recurrent unit must be equal
and fixed to the number of features used for training in
each dataset, where we set 42 for UNSW-NB15, 19 for IoT,
178 for Windows, 40 for Linux and 233 for network in
Ton IoT respectively. Furthermore, we claim that our model
is insensitive to the other hyper-parameters, such as kernel
size, dropout rate, which can be freely tuned in a reasonable
manner.
C. Testing Performance on Ton IoT Testbed
Ton IoT include nine types of attacks for testing: Scan-
ning, DoS, DDoS, Ransomware, Injection, Backdoor, XSS,
Password and MITM. An overall of testing performance of
Densely-ResNet on Ton IoT testbed is shown in Table II.
Densely-ResNet is trained separately on the Edge, Fog and
Cloud layers, where the Fog layer includes Windows and
Linux endpoints, which also need to be trained separately.
For the Edge layer, the detection engine can 100% detect
all attacks monitored by IoT sensors, which include Backdoor,
Password, Injection, DDoS, Ransomware, XSS and Scanning,
without FARs.
For the Windows endpoint in Fog layer, the detection engine
can achieve a 98.51% DR with a 0.05% FAR for Scanning
attack, where the rest of attacks (DDoS, Password, Backdoor,
Injection, XSS, DoS, Ransomware and MITM) can be 100%
detected without FARs.
For the Linux endpoint in Fog layer, the detection engine
can achieve a 95.33% DR for Password attack with a 0.19%
FAR, a 99.03% DR for XSS attack and a 81.82% DR for
MITM attack without FARs, where the rest of attacks (DDoS,
DoS, Injection, Scanning) can be 100% detected without
FARs.
For the Cloud layer, the detection engine can achieve a
99.95% DR for DDoS attack without a FAR, a 99.95% DR
for XSS attack with a 0.03% FAR, and a 100% DR for
Ransomware attack with a 0.06% FAR, where the rest of
attacks (Backdoor, Password, Injection, Scanning, DoS and
MITM) can be 100% detected without FARs.
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D. Correlation Analysis on Ton IoT Testbed
The correlation analysis module is used to identify the
attacks which are truly happened and caused consequences
on the victim machine. Due to most of attacks happened in
different time periods, which cannot be completely captured
and monitored, we select four different time intervals for
the correlation analysis, which are 56000, 58000, 60000,
62000. There are five attacks within the time intervals and
concurrently happened in all Edge, Fog and Cloud layers,
which are Password, Injection, DDoS, XSS and Scanning.
The result of correlation analysis is shown in Fig 5, where
we use a metric of True Detection Rate (TDR) to measure
the attacks simultaneously detected in the all three layers. It
can be observed that the TDR is lower than the DR that we
presented in Section VI-C, which means that a number of
attacks happened but failed to compromise the victim machine.
Furthermore, it can also be observed that the TDR will
not significantly fluctuate with the different interval of time
TABLE III
TESTING PERFORMANCE ON UNSW-NB15 BENCHMARK
Method ACC% TP TN FP FN DR% FAR% Precision% Recall% F1 Score Runtime/s
AdaBoost [38] 45.02 44,404 14,491 22,509 928 97.95 60.84 66.36 97.95 79.12 40.42
RF [39] 53.61 41,028 20,409 16,591 4,304 90.51 44.84 71.21 90.51 79.71 7.49
SVM (RBF) [40] 65.00 45,089 21,824 15,176 243 99.46 41.02 74.82 99.46 85.40 2597.83
MLP [41] 67.45 45,212 21,529 15,471 120 99.74 41.81 74.51 99.74 85.30 192.46
HAST-IDS [42] 67.75 44,997 22,410 14,590 335 99.26 39.43 75.51 99.26 85.77 259.02
LSTM [43] 68.27 44,083 24,231 12,769 1,249 97.24 34.51 77.54 97.24 86.28 133.35
CNN [44] 68.62 44,377 22,819 14,181 955 97.89 38.33 75.78 97.89 85.43 111.54
LuNet [45] 72.67 44,801 24,729 12,271 531 98.83 33.16 78.50 98.83 87.50 286.58
Densely-ResNet 73.93 43,826 26,680 10,320 1,506 96.68 27.89 80.94 96.68 88.11 849.18
windows. Hence, we can confirm that the correlation analysis
module is insensitive to the selection of time threshold.
E. Result Interpretability
Poor interpretability is one of the key problems on using
ML for attack recognition. The reason is that traditional ML
cannot directly learn raw data, which include many categorical
records with non-standard data formats, but requires to convert
them as numeric values by using statistical methods, for exam-
ple, ip address 192.168.1.27 will be converted to {0, 1, 0, 0},
which represents True in four different existing ip records as
shown in Fig 6.
Raw Source IP Address: { 192.168.1.25, 192.168.1.27, 192.168.1.78, 192.168.1.26 }
Processed IP ( 192.168.1.27 ) == { 0, 1, 0, 0 }
Fig. 6. Result Interpretability
The converted features are eventually hard to be used for
attack proof and post-analysis since they have lost the original
meanings for explanation. However, due to Densely-ResNet is
built with several Conv-GRU structures, it is able to learn
raw data records to keep their originality, which significantly
improves the capability of result interpretability.
F. Testing Performance on UNSW-NB15 Benchmark
The testing set of UNSW-NB15 consists of around 86,000
unknown attacks that are never seen in the training set to
make sure the reliability of the evaluation. The detection result
of Densely-ResNet on UNSW-NB15 benchmark is shown in
Fig 7.
With a closer inspection to the figure, Densely-ResNet
can achieve an impressive detection performance on most of
attacks. However, the detector has a moderate capability to
detect Backdoor and Fuzzers and presents a higher FAR than
others. It is worth to note that our detection engine fails to
detect the analysis attacks. Tow reasons may lead to the poor
detection result:
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Fig. 7. Detection Result on UNSW-NB15 Benchmark
1) Analysis behaviour are usually ambiguous with nor-
mal behaviour, such as executing some commands like
whoami and ipconfig, which are suspicious but may
also be used by legitimated users.
2) The records of analysis attack in UNSW-NB15 bench-
mark only take up around 0.27%, which is an imbal-
anced learning problem that often results in a poor
generalization performance.
Furthermore, we also compare the generalization perfor-
mance of Densely-ResNet with a number of ML and DL
methods as shown in Table III. It is obvious that Densely-
ResNet can achieve the best overall performance among these
methods, particularly with the lowest FAR; however, we can
also observe that Densely-ResNet leads to a higher run-time
consumption, which is caused by its high algorithm and
computation complexity.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduce the Ton IoT testbed for cyber
security assessment and propose the Densely-ResNet for in-
trusion detection that comes from Edge, Fog and Cloud layers.
We also conduct a correlation analysis to identify those attack
events that have truly compromised the victim machine.
Furthermore, Densely-ResNet is evaluated on UNSW-NB15
benchmark to compare its generalization performance with a
number of ML and DL methods. As a result, Densely-ResNet
can achieve the state-of-the-art detection accuracy on UNSW-
NB15 benchmark and simultaneously maintain a lower false
alarm rate. We confirm the effectiveness and robustness of
Densely-ResNet based on the evaluation results and encourage
researchers to use it for other tasks of intrusion detection in
the future.
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